Chipman v. Florence

District Judge. Joe Wince, John Dolan, and Thomas Dusing appeal the denial

of summary judgment on Susan Stemler's claim of violation

Argued: December 5, 2002 of equal protection. Wince appeals the denial of summary

judgment on Stemler's claims of fabrication of evidence and

Decided and Filed: December 2, 2003 excessive force.

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and SILER and GIBBONS, This case arises out of an incident that occurred on

Circuit Judges. February 19, 1994. We have reviewed this case on a previous

appeal. The relevant facts are described at length in Stemler

_________________ v. Florence , 126 F.3d 856 (1997). Briefly, Black was killed

in a car accident shortly after police officers allegedly

COUNSEL removed her from Stemler's car and placed her in the truck of

her boyfriend, Steve Kritis. Both Black and Kritis had been ARGUED: Eric C. Deters, ERIC C. DETERS & drinking heavily, and after an altercation between them at a ASSOCIATES, Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, for Plaintiffs. Jeffrey bar, Black left with Stemler in Stemler's car. Kritis then C. Mando, ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & began to chase the women on the streets of Florence before DUSING, Co vi ngto n, Kent ucky, for Defendants. both the car and the truck were stopped by the police after a ON BRIEF: Eric C. Deters, ERI C C. DETERS & concerned citizen alerted them to the situation. Stemler was ASSOCIATES, Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, for Plaintiffs. Jeffrey arrested for driving under the influence. Witnesses say that C. Mando, ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & all the police officers present repeated Kritis's assertion that DUSING, Covington, Kentucky, Hugh O. Skees, ROUSE, Stemler was a lesbian to each other and to others present. No SKEES, WILSON & DI LLON, Florence, Kentucky , David police officer ever checked Kritis for intoxication or asked Whalin, LANDRUM & SHOUSE, Louisville, Kentucky, for him to leave his truck. Black was either escorted or carried Defendants. from Stemler's car to the passenger seat of Kritis's truck.

Kritis then drove away and turned onto the northbound lanes

_________________ of I-75. According to Kritis, Black, who had passed out,

OPINION woke up and began to hit Kritis. He began to hit back and

_________________ lost the guard control of the rail. Black was partially truck. The truck s ejected from the passenger- werved and collided with

BOGGS, Chief Judge. Appellant/cross-appellee William side window. Her arm was completely severed from her body Chipman, administrator of the estate of Conni Black, and and her head was split into two parts by some part of the intervenor-appellant/cross-appellee Randy Black appeal the guardrail.

I. The Claims motions for summary judgment of Florence and Boone

Co unty. Chipman v. City of Florence , 858 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. A. Chipman's claim Ky. 1994), reconsideration denied on amended complaint ,

866 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Ky. 1994).

On March 7, 1994, William Chipman, the administrator of

the estate of Conni Black, filed a wrongful death action in the On appeal, we upheld the district court's order granting

Boone County Circuit Court against Florence police officers summary judgment to the municipal defendants, Florence and

Dusing, Dolan, and Wince; Boone County police officers Rob Boone County. Stemler , 126 F.3d at 866. However, we

Reuthe and Chris Alsip; the City of Florence; and Ron reversed the district court's dismissal of Chipman's claims

Kenner, the Boone County Sheriff. The Boone County against the individual officers. We held that Chipman had

Circuit Court entered summary judgment on behalf of the pled facts sufficient to maintain her substantive due process

defendants on Chipman's wrongful death claim. Chipman v. claim against the individual officers. Id. at 870. The only

City of Florence , No. 94-CI-00202 slip op. at 4 (Boone Co., state court decision prior to our decision was the Boone

Ky., Cir. Ct. Apr. 2, 1996). The Kentucky Court of Appeals County Circuit Court decision awarding judgment to the

reversed the Circuit Court. Chipman v. City of Florence , No. defendant officers, holding that Black was not in custody

1996-CA-001287-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1998). The when the pickup struck the guardrail and that none of the state

Kentucky Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals actors were the direct cause of her death on the highway . We

and reinstated the summary judgment ordered by the Boone stated in Stemler that "[w]hile these findings are entitled to

County Circuit Court. City of Florence v. Chipman , 38 S.W. preclusive effect, they are irrelevant to the merits of her

3d 387 (Ky. 2001). substantive due process claim." Id. at 870 n.12. The case

was remanded to the district court for further proceedings

Chipman also filed a complaint in federal court against the consistent with the opinion.

same defendants on March 31, 1994.¹ The complaint alleged

that the defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Shortly after the opinion issued, Randy Black was granted

Black's wrongful death because they had displayed deliberate permission to intervene on behalf of Conni Black's minor

indifference by forcing her into Kritis's car.² child, Shianne Black, to bring a claim of loss of parental

consortium. At about the same time, the federal district court

Chipman's federal claims were dismissed by the district held the case in abeyance pending a decision by the Kentucky court in 1994. The district court granted the individual Supreme Court on appeal of the Boone County Circuit court's officers' motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil order entering summary judgment in favor of defendants and Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim, on the ground the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversal of that order, which of qualified immunity. The district court also granted the was issued February 22, 2001. Chipman later reached a

settlement with the Boone Count y officers. In June 2001, the district court granted the officers' motion for summary

1

We treated the complaint against Kenner as a suit directly against judgment on Chipman's substantive due process claim, and Boone County. Stemler , 126 F.3d at 864 n.8. Shianne Black's claim for loss of parental consortium. The

district court found that the decision of the Kentucky

2

This claim will be referred to as "the substantive due process claim." Supreme Court barred their claims under the doctrine of issue preclusion. The issue that the district court found could not imprisonment. It also found that her abuse of process claim be relitigated was whether Black was in "custody" when she was barred based on the probable cause finding, that the got into Kritis's car because, according to the district court, officers had no improper motive in arresting her, and that a the Kentucky Supreme Court had held that Black was never state prosecutor independently had made the prosecutorial in custody. decisions in her criminal case. As for her claims of negligent

or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found B. Stemler's Claims that under Kentucky law, there is no viable cause of action for

these torts when she had raised essentially identical claims

Susan Stemler filed a federal complaint, pursuant to under traditional torts as discussed above. Finally, the court 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against officers Wince, Dolan, Dusing, and determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact the Ci ty o f Florence. The complaint alleged claims of with respect to her assault and battery claim against Wince, excessive force, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and but not against Dusing and Dolan. Stemler later voluntarily violation of equal protection on the bases of sex and sexual dismissed this claim. The Kentucky Court of Appeals orientation. The district court granted the officers' Rule affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Stemler did not 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss on the ground of qualified pursue an appeal.

im mu ni ty. The district court then consolidated her case with

Chipman's and awarded summary judgment to Florence. The Upon appeal of the district court decision to this court, we

federal district court then entered an order granting Stemler's affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City

motion for voluntary dismissal of her excessive force claim of Florence. Stemler , 126 F.3d at 866. We also affirmed the

against Wince. This voluntary dismissal was entered dismissal of her false arrest and malicious prosecution claims

pursuant to an agreement between the parties to dismiss the because the Boone County Circuit Court's finding that there

claim so that an appeal could proceed in this court. The had been probable cause to arrest and prosecute Stemler

agreement allowed her to bring her claim again should she be precluded relitigating that issue in this court. Id. at 871-72.

successful upon appeal. We noted that although Stemler seemed to be asserting a

claim that Wince had falsified evidence against her, and that

As Chipman did, Stemler had also brought similar claims the state court's finding of probable cause would not preclude in Kentucky state court. She raised state-law claims of her from prosecuting this claim, she had failed to properly malicious prosecution, false arrest, abuse of process, assault plead it. Id. at 872. We stated that she would be free to file and battery , false imprisonment, and negligent or intentional a new complaint against Wince raising that claim. Ibid. infliction of emotional distress. Stemler v. Florence , No. 94- Finall y, we reversed the dismissal of Stemler's equal CI-00459. The Boone County Circuit Court held that she was protection claim of selective prosecution against the officers, precluded from prosecuting all of her claims, except for holding that the allegations in her complaint were sufficient assault and battery. See Stemler v. City of Florence , 126 F.3d to state a claim. Id. at 874.

856, 871 (6th Cir. 1997). There was ample evidence

constituting probable cause for her arrest. This barred her After our opinion in Stemler was issued, Stemler amended

false arrest and malicious prosecution claim. As the her complaint to allege that Wince fabricated the blood

defendants were police officers, the court found that there was

no distinction between her claims of false arrest and false

sample evidence used in her DUI trials.³ As it did in Univ. and Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Tenn. , 126 F.3d 849, 851 (6th

Chipman's case, the district court held Stemler's case in Cir. 1997); Kane v. Magna Mixer Co. , 71 F.3d 555, 560 (6th

abeyance pending final judgments in the state court Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1848 (1996). When

proceedings. In June 2001, the district court denied the deciding whether to afford preclusive effect to a state court

officers' motion for summary judgment on Stemler's claims judgment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,

of denial of equal protection based on selective prosecution, requires the federal court to give the prior adjudication the

and Wince's motion for summary judgment on her claims of same preclusive effect it would have under the law of the state

falsification of evidence, and excessive force. The district whose court issued the judgment. See Migra v. Warren City

court noted that none of these claims actually had been Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Heyliger , 126

litigated in state court. It stated that while it might agree with F.3d at 851-52.

the defendants that Stemler could and should have brought

these claims in state court, our opinion in Stemler had implied Under Kentucky law, "[c]laim preclusion bars a party from

that claim preclusion did not apply. The court further stated re-litigating a previously adjudicated cause of action and

that our holding in Stemler stated that she could proceed with entirely bars a new lawsuit on the same cause of action."

these claims, and that the "law of the case" would be violated Yeoman v. Kentucky Health Policy Bd ., 983 S.W.2d 459, 465

if it did not permit her to do so. (Ky. 1998). "Issue preclusion bars the parties from

relitigating any issue actually litigated and finally decided in II. Chipman's substantive due process claim an earlier action." Ibid.

Chipman argues that our resolution of the custody issue in A. Issue Preclusion

his favor in Stemler should have had preclusive effect on the

Kentucky state courts. He argues that our opinion's holdings In order for issue preclusion to apply in Kentucky, (1) the

constituted the "law of the case" and the district court erred in issue in the second case must be the same as the issue in the

applying the doctrine of issue preclusion based on the state first case, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated,

court proceedings. The officers argue that the district court (3) the issue must have been actually decided, and (4) the

was correct in deciding that issue preclusion barred the decision on the issue in the prior action must have been

relitigation of the issue of custody. Alternatively, they argue necessary to the court's judgment. Ibid. The district court

that Chipman's substantive due process claim is barred from found that all four factors were met when the Kentucky

further litigation under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, or Supreme Court resolved Chipman's state claims.

under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

In order for Chipman to prevail in the Kentucky state

We review de novo a district court's decision with regard courts, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that he had to to issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Heyliger v. State show "the existence of a duty and unless a special relationship

was present, there is no duty owing from any of the police officers . . . ." Chipman , 38 S.W. 3d at 392. The court went

the injury producing act occurred, and 2) the violence or other court made an explicit statement that there was insufficient offensive conduct must have been committed by a state evid ence to su pport a findin g that Black was i n cus to dy. actor." Ibid. The court held that "[t]here is no evidence from

which it can be ascertained that Black was in state custody or However, the Kentucky Supreme Court's statement that she

otherwise restrained by the police at the time the pickup truck was never in custody was not necessary to its judgment. The

struck the guardrail with the fatal result. In addition, there is Boone County Circuit Court held that there was no genuine

no evidence to support a claim that the conduct which caused issue of material fact regarding whether Black was in custody

the pickup truck to leave the roadway and strike the guardrail at the time the pickup struck the guardrail - the point at which

was the result of the actions of the police officers." Ibid. the injury-producing act occurred. Specifically, it stated she

was not in custody at this point. This was the only holding

The Kentucky Supreme Court also stated that Black was necessary for the affirmance of the Boone County Circuit never in custody. Id. at 393. This is precisely the issue that Court's judgment. As we noted in discussing this lower court is relevant in a § 1983 action. In order to prevail on the decision in Stemler , the holdings of the state court on this § 1983 claim, Chipman needs to show that the defendant issue are entitled to preclusive effect. Nonetheless, this officers "violated substantive due process by placing [Black] precise issue is irrelevant to the substantive due process at risk of harm from a third party . . . ." Stemler , 126 F.3d at claim.

867. The court must first determine whether "the plaintiff and

the state actors had a sufficiently direct relationship such that As the Kentucky Court of Appeals (now the Kentucky

the defendants owed [Black] a duty not to subject her to Supreme Court) stated in Sedley v. City of West Buechel , 461

danger," and then "the court must also conclude that the S.W.2d 556, 558 (Ky. 1971):

officers were sufficiently culpable to be liable under a

substantive due process theory." Ibid. As to the first part, the The general rule is that a judgment in a former action

relevant inquiry is whether Black was in custody at the time operates as an estoppel only as to matters which were

the officers allegedly forced her into Kritis's truck. necessarily involved and determined in the former action,

and is not conclusive as to matters which were

First, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that there was no immaterial or unessential to the determination of the evidence in the record to support a finding that Black was prior action or which were not necessary to uphold the ever in cust ody, the same issue that is necessary to Chipman's judgment.

federal claim. Second, the custody issue was actually

litigated in the state courts: in the Boone County Circuit (Emphasis added).

Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky

Supreme Court. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that As the Kentucky Supreme Court correctly stated, our

there was no evidence to support a finding that Black was statements in Stemler regarding whether Black was in custody

ever in custody in the context of deciding the appeal of a were dicta, as the only issue before us at that point was the

summary judgment motion. A summary judgment order is a sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Similarly, the

decision on the merits. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United statements of the Kentucky Supreme Court regarding whether

States , 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Third, the issue Black was ever in custody are dicta, as they are not necessary

was actually decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The

to the state courts' disposition of the case. The actual holding B. Claim Preclusion

of the Kentucky Supreme Court reads:

The defendant officers also argue that claim preclusion

In order for a claim to be actionable in negligence, there should bar Chipman's claim against them. Claim preclusion must be the existence of a duty and unless a special bars further litigation under Kentucky law when: (1) there is relationship was present, there is no duty owing from any identity of the parties; (2) there is identity of the causes of of the police officers to Black to protect her from crime action; and (3) the action has been resolved on the merits. or accident. In order for the special relationship to exist, Yeoman , 983 S.W.2d at 465. Yeoman also stated that "[f]or two conditions are required: 1) the victim must have been claim preclusion to apply, the subject matter of the in state custody or otherwise restrained by the state at the subsequent suit must be identical." Ibid. time the injury producing act occurred , and 2) the violence or other offensive conduct must have been In Barnes v. McDowell , 848 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1988), we committed by a state actor. Neither of these factors can stated that "Kentucky courts do not apply the doctrine of be found from the undisputed material facts in this case. claim preclusion in a subsequent suit involving facts already There is no evidence from which it can be ascertained at issue in another action when the causes of action in the two that Black was in state custody or otherwise restrained by proceedings are not the same." Id. at 730. A district court, the police at the time the pickup truck struck the interpreting Kentucky law, stated: guardrail with the fatal result . In addition, there is no evidence to support a claim that the conduct which [W]here the second action between the same parties is caused the pickup truck to leave the roadway and strike upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the the guardrail was the result of the actions of the police prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those officers. matters in issue or points controverted, upon the

determination of which the finding or verdict was City of Florence v. Chipman , 38 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Ky. 2001) rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to (emphasis added and citations omitted). apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one

cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a

The Kentucky Supreme Court would have reached the same different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as result if it had found that Black was in custody at the time she to the point or question actually litigated and determined entered Kritis's truck, so long as it found she was not in in the original action, not what might have been thus custody at the time the truck hit the guardrail. litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the

judgment conclusive in another action.

The district court erred in finding that issue preclusion

barred Chipman's substantive due process claim. Presbyterian Child Welfare Agency of Buckhorn v. Nelson

County Bd. of Adjustment , 185 F. Supp. 2d 716, 720 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (quoting Louisville v. Louisville Professional Firefighters Ass'n , 813 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Ky. 1991)).

While there is identity of the parties, and the action was the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues resolved on the merits, Chipman's claim is not barred, as it is before it . W here federal relief can only be predicated not the same claim as in state court. His claim in the state upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is courts was for wrongful death, which is a negligence claim. difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in This is not the same cause of action as the one he brought in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the the federal court, a claim of violation of Black's substantive state-court judgment.

due process rights. It is indeed true that this claim could have

been brought in state courts. However, under the Kentucky Id. at 391 (quoting Catz v. Chalker , 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th

law of claim preclusion, this does not matter, as there is no Cir. 1998)). In Peterson Novelties , we held that the Rooker-

identity of the causes of action. Yeoman , 983 S.W.2d at 465. Feldman doctrine was inapplicable to claims that the state

Chipman's federal claim is not barred by claim preclusion. court did not address or rule upon even though the federal

claims arose out of the same nucleus of facts. Id. at 391-93. C. Rooker-Feldman Therefore, the question is whether this court could hold that

the officers violated Black's constitutional rights without

The defendant officers also argue that the federal district implicitly holding that the state court wrongly decided the court lacked jurisdiction to consider Chipman's claim under issues before it. Id. at 393.

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. They argue that Chipman's

federal suit is an attempt to appeal a state court decision to the This court discussed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its

federal courts. frequent conflation with claim and issue preclusion in

Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County , 326 F.3d 747 (6th Cir.

The doctrine gets its name from two Supreme Court cases. 2003). This court stated that Seventh Circuit case law Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 provided a useful way to determine which doctrine to appl y: (1923), held that the power to hear appeals from state court

judgments is exclusively held by the United States Supreme In order to determine the applicability of the Rooker-

Court. The Supreme Court held in District of Columbia Feldman doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate

Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the

(1983), that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment

hear challenges to certain state-court decisions. The Rooker- itself or is distinct from that judgment. If the injury

Feldman doctrine states that "lower federal courts lack alleged resulted from the state court judgment itself,

subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of Rooker-Feldman directs that the lower federal courts lack

state court proceedings or to adjudicate claims 'inextricably jurisdiction. If t he in ju ry alleged is distinct from that

intertwined' with issues decided in state court proceedings." judgment, i.e., the party maintains an injury apart from

Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. Berkley , 305 F.3d 386, 390 (6th the loss in state court and not "inextricably intertwined"

Cir. 2002). In defining "inextricably intertwined," we have with the state judgment, . . . res judicata may apply, but

adopted the reasoning that: Rooker - Feldman does not . . . .

[t]he federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the Id. at 755 (quoting Garry v. Geils , 82 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (7th state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to Cir. 1996)). As Chipman is not directly challenging the state court's circuit court that Stemler cannot establish that they acted with

judgments in federal court, the doctrines of claim and issue an improper motive." Stemler v. City of Florence , No. 1996- preclusion are more properly applied to this case. However, CA-001318-MR at 23. The court made this statement in the in any case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. context of discussing the propriety of summary judgment The Kentucky Supreme Court's discussion of whether Black regarding Stemler's abuse of process claim. One of the was ever in custody was dicta, and therefore any finding by essential elements of that tort is an ulterior purpose. Bonnie the federal court that Black was in custody at some point Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson , 598 S.W. 2d 765, 766 (Ky. Ct. during the encounter would not implicitly hold that the state App. 1980). It was one of several findings of fact that court improperly decided the issues before it . The issue of supported the granting of summary judgment in favor of the Black's custody before the truck hit the guardrail was not an defendants.

issue that was salient before the Kentucky court.

Stemler argues that our statement in our opinion in Stemler

The district court does have jurisdiction to hear Chipman's that "the record evidence supports a finding" that the officers substantive due process claim. chose to arrest her because they believed her to be a lesbian

should have had preclusive effect on the Kentu cky state III. Stemler's Claims courts. However, this statement was dicta. We reversed the

district court's dismissal of her claim on a 12(b)(6) motion. A. Equal Protection Claim Thus the only question before our court was whether her

complaint adequately stated an equal protection claim. A

The defendants argue that Stemler's equal protection claim dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6) "is proper only if it appears is barred by claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and the beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court, although support of its claims that would entitle it to relief." inclined to rule that her claim was barred by claim preclusion, Kostrzewa v. City of Troy , 247 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2001). instead decided that this court's decision in Stemler precluded That judgment does not preclude a later summary judgment the application of any of those doctrines. We first note that motion, arguing that the plaintiff in fact could not show such the district court was not required to abstain from analyzing evidence. In state court, the claim was being considered for Stemler's claims under the claim preclusion doctrine because summary judgment purposes. A summary judgment order is of our previous opinion. Our opinion was issued while a decision on the merits. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. , 922 F.2d Stemler's appeal was pending with the Kentucky Court of at 325. Thus the issue was actually litigated in the state Appeals. We stated that at that point , claim preclusion did courts. And, as the state court made an explicit finding that not yet apply to her claims before the federal courts. We the officers had no improper motive, the issue was actually nowhere said t hat claim preclu si on woul d n ever appl y. decided.

The defendant officers argue that the Kentucky Court of In order to maintain a claim of selective prosecution (the Appeals decision conclusively decided the question of basis of Stemler's equal protection claim), the plaintiff must whether they had acted with improper motive in arresting her. prove that a state actor initiated the prosecution with a The Court of Appeals stated that "[a]lthough the officers may discriminatory purpose. This is the same issue as the ulterior have been crude during Stemler's arrest, we agree with the purpose issue in Stemler's state claim of abuse of process. And finally, the issue was necessary to the resolution of the her state law claims bars her from reviving her assault and state claim. Thus, the state court's finding that the officers battery claims.

did not have an improper motive in arresting Stemler has

preclusive effect on relitigating that issue in the federal First, a voluntary dismissal of a claim is not a judgment on

courts. the merits. Ky. R. Civ. P. 41.01. While Stemler's assault and

battery claim was dismissed with prejudice against Dolan and

Because Stemler's equal protection claim is barred by issue Dusing, the state court did not grant summary judgment to preclusion, the district court should have granted summary Wince, and issue preclusion does not apply to her claim judgment to the officers on that claim. against Wince. Second, the agreement itself does not bar her

from bringing her federal claim. As she was not successful B. Excessive Force on appeal in the state courts, the agreement would seem to bar

her from bringing her assault and battery claim again in state

Stemler's federal claim of excessive force and her state courts. However, the agreement addressed her federal and claim of assault and battery against Wince were voluntarily state claims separately. The agreement did not say that if she dismissed so that she could appeal unfavorable lower court was unsuccessful in the state courts that she was barred from decisions on other claims. Wince first argues that Stemler has bringing her federal excessive force claim again. The never taken any action to revive her federal claim. However, agreement that bars her from bringing her state assault and Stemler's Second Am ended C om pl aint was accepted by the battery claim is not a judgment for the purposes of issue district court on January 13, 1998. Her Second Amended preclusion, as Wince seems to argue.

Complaint incorporated by reference her initial complaint and

her First Amended complaint, which included the excessive Wince next argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred

force claim. Furthermore, Wince does not explain why he did the district court from considering Stemler's claims since any

not make this argument when he moved the district court for decision favorable to her would have been an impermissible

summary judgment on this claim, and why the district court review of issues decided adversely to her in the Kentucky

denied his summary judgment motion without ever state court. He also argues that the claim preclusion doctrine

addressing this issue. bars her from relitigating this claim in the federal courts as

well. We will discuss the application of these doctrines

Wince next argues that the voluntary dismissal agreement below in conjunction with Stemler's other outstanding claim. bars Stemler from reviving her excessive force claim because

it bars her from reviving her assault and battery claim. The

agreement stated that if her appeal to the state appellate court

on her other state claims was unsuccessful, then her assault

and battery claim could not be revived, and vice versa. It

similarly stated that if her appeal to the federal appellate court

was unsuccessful, then her excessive force claim could not be

revived, and vice versa. He argues that because both claims

rely on the same facts and elements of proof, the dismissal of

C. The application of claim preclusion and the Rooker- courts confined themselves to the issues of probable cause

Feldman doctrines to Stemler's Fabrication of and the motive for Stemler's arrest. The district court could Evidence and Excessive Force Claims rule in Stemler's favor without even implicitly holding that

the Kentucky courts wrongly decided the issues before them.

Wince argues that Stemler's excessive force and fabrication The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to these claims, of evidence claims should be barred by claim preclusion and and the district court has jurisdiction to hear them. the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Wince also argues that claim preclusion would bar Stemler

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as previously noted, states from bringing these claims in federal court, because as she that "lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to could have brought them in state court. However, as engage in appellate review of state court proceedings or to discussed above, the Kentucky law of claim preclusion only adjudicate claims 'inextricably intertwined' with issues bars bringing the same cause of action twice. Stemler's claims decided in state court proceedings." Peterson Novelties , 305 for falsification of evidence and excessive force could have F.3d at 390. The question for this court is whether a federal been brought in state court and were not. However, under court can rule in Stemler's favor on her federal claims without Kentucky law, as she did not bring identical causes of action implicitly holding that the state courts wrongly decided the in state court, she is not barred from bringing them in federal issues before them. Id. at 393. court. Yeoman , 983 S.W. 2d at 465 . The district court did not

err when it decided that claim preclusion did not apply to

The state courts adjudicated several of Stemler's claims. these claims.

As noted above, Stemler's claims of malicious prosecution

and false arrest and imprisonment were dismissed on IV. Conclusion

summary judgment because the state court held that there was

no genuine issue that probable cause existed for her DUI In No. 01-5956, we REVERSE the grant of summary

arrest. Her claims of intentional or negligent infliction of judgment to the defendants on Chipman's substantive due

emotional distress and outrage were dismissed on summary process claim. In No. 01-6205, we REVERSE the denial of

judgment because Kentucky law holds that if a claimant raises summary judgment with regard to Stemler's equal protection

claims under traditional torts that allow recovery for claim. We AFFIRM the denial of summary judgment with

emotional distress, the claimant cannot raise claims of regard to Stemler's excessive force and falsification of

intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress or evidence claim. Both cases are REMANDED to the district

outrage. The Boone County Circuit Court found that there court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

was a genuine issue of material fact as to her assault and

battery claim against Wince.

Except for the decision refusing to dismiss her assault and

battery claim against Wince, the Kentucky state courts never

considered or ruled on any elements of the claims of

fabrication of evidence or excessive force, nor did they

address any facts or issues regarding these claims. The state